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Abstract
The use of wearable devices for fitness and health
tracking is on an upward curve with a range of devices
now available from a number of manufacturers. The
devices work with smart devices to exchange data
via Bluetooth communication protocol. This paper
presents the results of an initial study on the security
and privacy weaknesses of wearable fitness devices. It
discusses methods to 1) capture and process data sent
from a wearable device to its paired smartphone during
synchronization and 2) analyze the records to track
individuals and make predictions. The data analysis
methods use supervised machine-learning techniques to
train a classifier for associating synchronization records
with the individuals, their physical activities, and
conditions under which they were performed. Results of
the study show that the methods allow individuals and
their activities to be tracked, both of which infringe
on the privacy of the user. The paper also provides
recommendations on improving the security of wearable
devices based on the initial research results.
keywords: wearable fitness device; security; privacy;
tracking; machine-learning techniques.
1 Introduction
Advancements in wireless communication, sensing
and micro-electro-mechanical system (MEMS) tech-
nologies have resulted in a growing market of wearable
medical devices. According to market research [9]
worldwide revenue in the wearable medical devices
market is expected to reach $2.3 billion by 2017,
while more than 50 million devices will be shipped
annually. A variety of wearable medical and fitness
devices have come up, which collect continuous and
discrete physiological data about the wearer’s health.
These devices are capable of collecting health related
data such as blood pressure, electrocardiogram, heart
rate, glucose level, etc.
Wearable devices are small and worn by their users
throughout the day to collect data and store them on
the device. However, because the devices have little
storage capacity, periodically they must be paired with
another device to oﬄoad the collected data. Many
of them use a smartphone as a pairing device and
both devices exchange data using Bluetooth as the
wireless communication protocol. Once the data have
been transported to a paired mobile device, it uploads
them over an Internet connection to a Cloud service for
further processing, storage, tracking, and visualization.
The mobile device also visualizes the physiological data
to the user.
The raw physiological data collected by wearable
medical devices and exchanged between wearable and
mobile device can be sensitive and private in nature
containing personally identifiable information about the
users including health information. For many man-
ufacturers of wearables though, data throughput and
energy consumption are major concerns and override
often the security protocols. Sometimes, the primary
security protocols rely on older technology and do not
prevent unauthorized interception or corruption of the
data.
We are interested in studying the vulnerabilities of
the Bluetooth communication channel between a wear-
able device and its paired mobile smartphone to exploit
its weaknesses and launch attacks on the confidentiality
and privacy of data. For our initial study, we considered
three different devices including the Fitbit, the Pebble
Watch, and the Misfit Flash because they are widely
available fitness-tracking devices that use the Bluetooth
4.0 communication protocol to exchange data with a
smartphone. The smartphone runs an application from
which users can trigger device synchronization with the
wearable to collect the latest fitness data. Although we
studied the security weaknesses of all three devices, we
started with the Misfit Flash to build the customized
tools for intercepting and analyzing the data.
Manufacturers of wearable devices integrate a range
of different sensors such as dual axis thermal accelerom-
eters, piezoelectric sensors, temperature sensor, etc.
into a device to capture health and fitness related
information about the user [8, 5]. However, the device
collects and transmits abstract binary data from its
sensor that require specific algorithms to interpret them
and infer health or fitness-related information. The
data processing algorithms are not run on the wearable
device because of the limited computing capabilities
and power availability. The wearable device instead
transports them to a mobile device over the Bluetooth
channel. Thus, information extracted from packets
intercepted from the Bluetooth channel cannot be
directly related to fitness or health-related information
shown by a mobile device application. Instead, the bi-
nary data must be further processed, which is typically
done by the manufacturer’s Cloud services. Because
the binary data transmitted over the Bluetooth channel
are meaningless without the algorithms that process
them, our project applied machine-learning techniques
to learn an association between data captured during
synchronization and the information shown to users on
their mobile device such as number of steps, burned
calories, and more.
The remainder of the paper describes our methods to
collect, filter, and classify data from a wearable device
to infer fitness activities of users. The paper presents re-
sults from our experiments as well as potential solutions
to improve the security of wearables. Next, we describe
previous work related to the security vulnerabilities of
wearables and other Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
2 Related Work
The wearable technology and IoT industries are
poised to become increasingly mainstream, shaping
technology innovation to a wide range of applications
in health and wellness. However, security challenges
are a growing concern to consumers and the health
care industry and improving security of wearables and
wireless IoT devices and the awareness of security
threats is a major area of research [11], [10], [2]. Some
researchers have focused on the recording capabilities
of wearables of nearby devices that could be exploited
to track locations of users of a wearable device [4].
Our own work focuses on the application of machine-
learning techniques to “make sense” of unencrypted
binary data sent by a wearable to its mobile device.
Commercial and medical data is sensitive and per-
sonal. Hence, attackers should not be able to gain
access to such data. Most commercial wearable devices
such as Fitbit however use static MACs[4]. While static
MACs have been used successfully in networks for years,
in IoT and pervasive computing they represent a secu-
rity gap, which can potentially become a vulnerability.
Static MACs can be used to launch user correlation
attacks to identify a unique data stream bound to a
specific user. Static MACs further invite Bluesnarfing
attacks.
3 Methods of Tracking &
Detection
Our goal is to show that we are able to track
users of wearable devices and distinguish between their
activities. To accomplish this goal, we used several off-
the-shelf hardware and software tools and combined
them with simple python scripts to drive the data
collection and perform filtering and other processing
tasks. Our methodology consists of three steps: 1)
trigger the wearable, 2) capture the data, 3) classify
the data.
We start with triggering the wearable device to re-
lease its physiological data over the Bluetooth channel.
Next, we capture the wireless data packets and extract
the payload of individually transmitted wireless packets
to reconstruct the complete record of data sent by the
wearable device. Finally, we classify the extracted data
using machine learning techniques to make meaningful
inferences. The methods and tools used in each step
are described below.
3.1 Triggering Data Release from a
Wearable Device
To reverse-engineer the communication protocol we
have collected and analyzed wireless packets exchanged
between the wearable and mobile device during syn-
chronization using the techniques described below. Fol-
lowing the analysis of the packets, we have successfully
decoded the steps that trigger the release of data
packets and reproduced them using gattool and a
Python script as a driver program to automate the
steps. The gattool software is a developer support tool
that comes with the BlueZ Linux Bluetooth protocol
stack. It generates Bluetooth packets based on our
specification and sends them wirelessly to a nearby
wearable device.
The steps to trigger the release can be summarized
as follows:
• The wearable device begins advertising its basic
device and connection information.
• The mobile application that wishes to connect to
the wearable device sends a connection request to
it.
• Based on the specific values and format of the
data sent in the request, the wearable device starts
releasing its data.
It should be noted that in this process the wearable
device does not vet the source of the connection before
allowing a connection to be established.
3.2 Data Collection & Pre-Processing
We use a low-cost USB Bluetooth Low Energy (LE)
packet sniffer dongle that plugs into the USB port of
a laptop or desktop PC running Windows 7 or higher.
The accompanying sniffer software runs on the PC and
captures data packets transmitted wirelessly by nearby
devices. The software sends captured Bluetooth data
packets to Wireshark for visualization and storage in
the form of a pcap file. We use tshark, a command
line tool capable of reading and processing pcap files,
to convert individual Wireshark pcap files into text files
for subsequent processing.
To collect data when the wearable and mobile device
synchronize, we trigger the synchronization from a
mobile device or through the steps outlined above. The
Bluetooth sniffer and Wireshark collect the data. Once
the Wireshark program shows empty data packets,
indicating that the synchronization is complete, we save
the captured data as a pcap file. Next, we run tshark
to transform a pcap file to a text file. tshark combines
the individual data packets captured by the Bluetooth
Sniffer into a single transmission record that includes
all messages exchanged between wearable and mobile
device. It then saves the record in textual format in
a new file. The produced text file is then run through
a Python script that performs the following additional
operations on the file: First, it identifies the beginning
of each packet sent from the wearable device to the
mobile device to extract its payload. Next, it combines
the payload containing the sensed data into a new
data record in binary format. After this, the script
detects and removes redundant information from the
binary data, not needed in subsequent processing steps,
such as dates that tag the sensed data. The resulting
physiological data record is stored in a new text file as
a comma-separated string of bytes.
3.3 Machine-Learning Approaches for
Detection
The previously discussed methods can be used to
generate a text file that contains multiple records of
physiological data released by the wearable devices to
a mobile device. We use this information to build a
training data set for training classifiers that map wear-
able device data to users, their fitness activities, and
the output of the mobile device application pertaining
to the activity including calorie, steps, or walk count.
The training data set consists of a list of records
each stored on a separate line in the file. Each record
itself contains the physiological data captured from the
wearable device for a performed activity and the labels
and values attributed to the user and the recorded
activity. The wearable device data are represented as
a sequence of comma-separated byte values. To build
classifiers that predict the users and their activities
using the captured data, we use Weka [6], a publicly
available data mining tool. Weka provides a range
of supervised machine-learning algorithms for exper-
imentation. It allows users to import training data
and run them through specific algorithms. Users can
select the input and output fields in the data set on
which they want to train the algorithm. We chose to
experiment with Wekas implementation of a Decision
Tree, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and
a Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier as these algorithms work
best with small training data sets. Once the selected
learning algorithm completes the training of a classifier
for a single prediction, it can be subsequently used to
make predictions about newly captured synchronization
records from a wearable device.
4 Experimentation and Results
We have conducted an initial experiment involving
three of the five authors from this paper as participants
of the experiment. Each participant performed different
physical activities while wearing the Misfit Flash, that
does not use any encryption on its Bluetooth com-
munication channel with a mobile device. After each
participant completed a physical activity, he or she
synchronized the wearable device with a smartphone
and used the methods described above to intercept and
transform the physiological data that was sent to the
smartphone. The captured data was annotated with 1)
the name of the participant that performed the activity,
2) the terrain where the activity was performed, and 3)
the level of physical activity as indicated by the step
and calorie count shown on the mobile device.
We have labeled the type of terrain as hilly and
outdoors, flat and outdoors, and indoors. Furthermore,
Table 1: Distribution of Training Data Across the
Terrain, the Steps, and Calories.
Hilly Outdoor Flat Outdoor Flat Indoor
Terrain 3 11 15
Low Medium High
Steps 18 10 1
Calories 10 10 9
Table 2: 10-fold Classification Accuracy for Learning
Algorithms
DT RF SVM NB
Participant 93.10% 93.10% 79.31% 89.66%
Terrain 93.10% 86.21% 72.41% 79.31%
Steps 62.07% 58.62% 55.17% 68.97%
Calories 24.14% 51.72% 37.93% 41.38%
we have grouped the step and calorie counts into three
different groups for the learning algorithms to make
predictions of the level of physical activity and calories
and not on specific values. For the step count, we
labeled values as low, medium, or high when they
range from 0 to 1000, 1000 to 2000, or 2000 and above
respectively. For the calorie count, we labeled values as
low, medium, or high when they range from 0 to 40, 41
to 60, or 60 and above respectively.
In total, we collected 29 training records from three
participants that performed physical activities on run-
ning, biking in flat and hilly terrain, and walking
indoors and outdoors. Each training record consisted
of 800 bytes of physiological data captured from the
wearable device and labels for the name of participant,
the terrain, and the groups for steps and calories. The
different groups and distributions of training data are
shown in Table 1 above.
We trained classifiers using four different machine-
learning algorithms to make predictions on the partic-
ipant, terrain, step, and calorie levels. For evaluating
the performance of the different machine-learning algo-
rithms, we used a 10-fold cross validation test. Table
2 summaries the results. Values highlighted in bold
indicate the best performing algorithm.
As the performance results show, we achieved the
highest accuracy for predicting the participant using
either Decision Tree (DT) or Random Forest (RF) as
our learning algorithms. The Na¨ıve Bayesian (NB)
algorithm performed best for predicting the level of
steps. Finally, Random Forest (RF) performed best for
predicting the level of calories burned by each activity.
However, we only achieved an accuracy rate of slightly
higher than 50% for making predictions about calorie
consumption.
5 Discussion
Results of our initial experiment show that it is
possible to predict and track a user and his or her
fitness activity based on data intercepted from wearable
devices over its Bluetooth communication channel.
A closer analysis of the results from the decision
tree algorithm shows that the pruned decision trees
produced for making predictions are shallow in depth,
meaning that few values from the captured data were
needed to make the predictions. This is a surprising
result as the physiological data record sent from a
wearable to its mobile device is fairly large. The
variables that played a role in making a decision differed
across the different decision trees with the exception
of the decision tree for predicting the participant and
the terrain, which had a small overlap. This indicates
that the byte values in the captured data packets likely
represent different sensor values. The reason for the
overlap between the decision for predicting participant
and terrain may be the lack of variation of activities
across participants. Additional training data with a
greater degree of variation in the level of activities and
the terrain in which the activity was performed will be
needed to further assess the predictive quality of the
values in the captured data.
Many wearable devices advertise their presence over
the Bluetooth channel making themselves visible to
potential hackers that can exploit the security weak-
nesses to capture data from the devices. In this
project, we have exploited this weakness and tricked
a fitness tracking devices into releasing its data record.
With no encryption in place, we were able to capture
physiological data recorded by the device and classify it,
which constitutes a direct attack on the privacy of the
user data. However, by simply not advertising services
to nearby Bluetooth devices unless the user specifically
requests it, for example when the device must be paired
with a mobile device, by requiring authentication when
services on the wearable device are contacted, we will
make it difficult for hackers finding and controlling the
unauthorized release of data of the wearable device. In
addition, any randomness added to the format of the
data will make it difficult to make sense of intercepted
data. Such methods of data randomization can be
effective to prevent reverse-engineering of data formats
and the infringement of privacy on data sent through
the Bluetooth channel.
6 Solution Outline
Below, we outline two simple and energy efficient
schemes that can provide reasonable level of security
to wearable devices under the constraints of keeping
power consumption and time delay of the response
time to a minimum. As mentioned above, one of
the key reasons we were successful in our attack was
a lack of authentication mechanism on the wearable
device before it releases the data. For a wearable
device energy is at a premium as with any other
battery-powered device and hence many sophisticated
and proven authentication mechanisms [1], [12] are not
suitable while others such as PINs and biometrics are
not feasible due to the small form factor. This leads to
some manufacturers to completely drop authentication
in favor of low latency and energy saving.
We propose a simple authentication mechanism based
on One-way hash functions as shown in Algorithm
1 and described below. When a wearable is first
synchronized with a smartphone a secure secret (S) is
generated on each device. The secure secret can be
generated by any key exchange protocol such as the
well known Diffie-Hellman protocol. We argue that,
initial synchronization of a wearable and smartphone
generally takes place in an environment where power
is abundantly available and therefore the overhead of
set up is not an issue. When a mobile device wants to
connect with the wearable it generates a digest Ds
Ds = h(S||ti)
and sends it to the wearable. Where h(.) is a one way
hash function, S is the shared secret and ti is the current
time epoch. The wearable then generates its own digest
Dw using the shared secret it has and the current epoch
it knows. If both the digests match, the wearable goes
ahead with the connection request, otherwise it drops
the request. Since the wearable is time-synchronized
with the mobile device with which it was paired, both
devices will have the same value of the epoch ti. Both
devices also have the shared secret and therefore the
authentication will only work for the wearable and the
paired mobile device. This will stop the wearable from
responding to requests from arbitrary devices. This
scheme requires only two hash operations, one each
on the wearable and the mobile device. The execution
time of SHA-256 hashing algorithm on Cortex M series
processor, which is the processor on Misfit Flash is 1
msec [7]. The authentication scheme therefore only
introduces a delay of 2 msec and a corresponding energy
consumption of 25.8 µJ on each device. Thus a simple
low latency and low energy algorithm can stop random
triggering from the wearable.
Similar to the problems with authentication, some
manufacturers forego data encryption due to latency
and power constraints. However other more energy
efficient randomization methods can be used to provide
information theoretic security to the data. Below we
outline a simple randomization scheme based on CMT
Algorithm 1 Authentication Algorithm
Require: modulus p and G on both devices, time
epoch ti on both devices
Shared Secret Generation
1: The mobile device generates an integer d and sends
X = Gdmod p to the wearable
2: The wearable generates an integer e and sends Y =
Gemod p to the mobile device
3: Both devices calculate the shared secret S =
Xemod p = Y dmod p
On mobile device
4: Generate digest Ds = h(S||ti)
5: Transmit Ds to the wearable
On Wearable
6: Generate digest Dw = h(S||ti)
7: if Dw == Ds then
Accept the request.
8: else
Drop the request.
9: end if
encryption [3] which is semantically secure. The CMT
scheme encrypts data as
Enck(d) = (d+ fk(r))mod M
Where d is the data being encrypted, fk(.) is a pseudo
random function (PRF) based on key k which uses the
nonce r to generate a random number and M is an
integer which is a system parameter. CMT encryption
basically adds random noise to the data mod M, and is
secure under the assumption that fk(r) is random and
not disclosed to any third party. We can substitutefk(r)
with digest Dw on the wearable to add random noise
to the data. Digest Dw uses the shared secret S as the
key and the use of the time epoch ti means the value of
Dw will change with every epoch. This random noise in
the form of the digest is secure as long as the one way
hash function h(.) is secure. Thus our randomization
function on the wearable will then be,
dr = (d+Dw)mod M
where dr is the randomized data. This randomized data
will then be transmitted to the mobile device once the
wearable is successfully triggered after authentication.
Once the mobile device receives the randomized data, it
can easily remove the random noise since it knows the
shared secret S and the time epoch ti by calculating,
d = (dr −Ds)mod M
This randomization method also involves only two hash
operations on each side thus introducing only a small
amount of latency and energy overhead compared to
traditional symmetric and asymmetric key encryption
techniques.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Wearable devices are widely used to collect health-
related information of its users. Unfortunately, the
devices often lack proper implementation of security
protocols to protect the privacy and integrity of the
data as the data are exchanged with other devices over
a wireless network. In this paper, we have shown how a
wearable device, specifically the Misfit Flash, that does
not use encryption or authentication to synchronizing
data with its mobile device can be tricked into releasing
its data on demand by a nearby hacker. We have further
shown how the data can be collected and analyzed using
machine learning techniques to identify individuals and
track their behavior.
The next step in our project will be to include a
larger pool of participants and to vary the fitness
activities to generate a larger training data set for
experimentation. Furthermore, we will experiment
with applying and adapting the presented methods
to other, widely used wearable devices to study their
vulnerabilities and evaluate our proposed solutions in
improving the security of the devices.
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